While the focus within the UK legal IT industry is on the number of CVs being circulated by the remaining denizens of Chateau Despair in Leeds – aka the offices of LexisNexis Visualfiles – we’re grateful to our friends at Australasian Legal Technology (www.auslegal.com) for the following items…

• Paul Wyatt joins the ranks of those moving on from LexisNexis Visualfiles. Paul joined Visualfiles in 1998 spending eight years with them in the UK, before becoming their Australian Business Development Manager in 2006. His new role is as the NSW Business Development Manager with Law In Order who specialise in litigation document management, e-discovery and document copying and scanning.

• In another episode of legal technology musical chairs Andrea Foot (the person responsible for bringing Axxia to Australia) has left LexisNexis and moved across to Billback, with a job title of General Manager - Australasia Sales.

(Prior to joining Visualfiles – or Solicitec as it then was – Wyatt was with Linetime. Prior to moving to Australia, Foot was with Miles 33 and ITNET among others. Prior to becoming the home of Visualfiles, part of the building in Leeds housed the Headingley 10-pin bowling alley. We’re sure there is a joke in there but we can’t think of it.)

While the focus within the UK legal IT industry is on the number of CVs being circulated by the remaining denizens of Chateau Despair in Leeds – aka the offices of LexisNexis Visualfiles – we’re grateful to our friends at Australasian Legal Technology (www.auslegal.com) for the following items…

• Paul Wyatt joins the ranks of those moving on from LexisNexis Visualfiles. Paul joined Visualfiles in 1998 spending eight years with them in the UK, before becoming their Australian Business Development Manager in 2006. His new role is as the NSW Business Development Manager with Law In Order who specialise in litigation document management, e-discovery and document copying and scanning.

• In another episode of legal technology musical chairs Andrea Foot (the person responsible for bringing Axxia to Australia) has left LexisNexis and moved across to Billback, with a job title of General Manager - Australasia Sales.

(Prior to joining Visualfiles – or Solicitec as it then was – Wyatt was with Linetime. Prior to moving to Australia, Foot was with Miles 33 and ITNET among others. Prior to becoming the home of Visualfiles, part of the building in Leeds housed the Headingley 10-pin bowling alley. We’re sure there is a joke in there but we can’t think of it.)

Martijn W. Hesselink (Centre for the Study of European Contract Law) has posted Common Frame of Reference & Social Justice on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

This paper evaluates the draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) in terms of social justice. It concludes the DCFR has all the characteristics of a typical European compromise. Ideological and esthetical purists will certainly be disappointed. In this respect, it has much in common with the Constitutional Treaty. This is not necessarily something to be worried about. A common frame of reference is not made, in the first place (if at all), for esthetical or ideological reasons; it is meant to provide some normative guidance in the further development of European contract law.

Overall, from the point of view of social justice the DCFR is fairly balanced. There is certainly room for improvement. The laissez-faire concept of juridical acts should be removed. The list of underlying values, which may play an important role in the interpretation and further development of the CFR by the courts, must be made more balanced. The protection of consumers should be extended to SMEs at least in certain cases (notably unfair terms). The classical role of good faith as a basis for new judge-made obligations should be restored. However, the characterisations of the DCFR by some scholars as 'a law for big business and competent consumers' or, alternatively, as a 'massive reduction of private autonomy' are both exaggerations.

Martijn W. Hesselink (Centre for the Study of European Contract Law) has posted Common Frame of Reference & Social Justice on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

This paper evaluates the draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) in terms of social justice. It concludes the DCFR has all the characteristics of a typical European compromise. Ideological and esthetical purists will certainly be disappointed. In this respect, it has much in common with the Constitutional Treaty. This is not necessarily something to be worried about. A common frame of reference is not made, in the first place (if at all), for esthetical or ideological reasons; it is meant to provide some normative guidance in the further development of European contract law.

Overall, from the point of view of social justice the DCFR is fairly balanced. There is certainly room for improvement. The laissez-faire concept of juridical acts should be removed. The list of underlying values, which may play an important role in the interpretation and further development of the CFR by the courts, must be made more balanced. The protection of consumers should be extended to SMEs at least in certain cases (notably unfair terms). The classical role of good faith as a basis for new judge-made obligations should be restored. However, the characterisations of the DCFR by some scholars as 'a law for big business and competent consumers' or, alternatively, as a 'massive reduction of private autonomy' are both exaggerations.

Thomas Colby (George Washington University Law School) has posted Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past, Present, and Future of Punitive Damages (Yale Law Journal, Vol. 118, 2009) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

In Philip Morris v. Williams, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not permit the imposition of punitive damages to punish a defendant for harm caused to third parties. This Article critiques the reasoning, but seeks ultimately to vindicate the result, of this landmark decision. It argues that, although the Court's procedural due process analysis does not stand up to scrutiny, punitive damages as punishment for third-party harm do indeed violate procedural due process, but for reasons far more profound than those offered by the Court. To reach that conclusion, the Article confronts the most basic and fundamental questions about punitive damages - questions that the Supreme Court has studiously avoided for more than a century: what, exactly, is the purpose of punitive damages, and how is it constitutional to impose them as a form of punishment in a judicial proceeding without affording the defendant the protection of the Constitution's criminal procedural safeguards?

The Article argues that punitive damages are properly conceived of a form of punishment for private wrongs: judicially sanctioned private revenge. As such, the Article explains, it makes both theoretical and doctrinal sense to impose them without affording the defendant criminal procedural protections, which are necessitated only for the punishment of public wrongs on behalf of society. When, however, courts employ punitive damages as a form of punishment for public wrongs, they become a substitute for the criminal law and thus make an intolerable end run around the Bill of Rights. For that reason, Williams was ultimately correct that punitive damages must be limited to punishment for the harm done to the individual plaintiff, not the harm done to the general public.

The Article concludes by considering the future of punitive damages in light of the Williams decision. It concludes that, contrary to the emerging conventional wisdom, Williams does not stand in the way of the imposition of substantial extra-compensatory damages of the type favored by law and economics scholars as a means of forcing the defendant to internalize the costs of its behavior in order to achieve optimal deterrence. It is the fact that punitive damages punish, and that they do so in order to vindicate the interests of the state, that precludes their use to address third-party harms. Once the element of punishment is eliminated from the remedy, the constitutional infirmity at issue in Williams is ameliorated.

Thomas Colby (George Washington University Law School) has posted Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past, Present, and Future of Punitive Damages (Yale Law Journal, Vol. 118, 2009) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

In Philip Morris v. Williams, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not permit the imposition of punitive damages to punish a defendant for harm caused to third parties. This Article critiques the reasoning, but seeks ultimately to vindicate the result, of this landmark decision. It argues that, although the Court's procedural due process analysis does not stand up to scrutiny, punitive damages as punishment for third-party harm do indeed violate procedural due process, but for reasons far more profound than those offered by the Court. To reach that conclusion, the Article confronts the most basic and fundamental questions about punitive damages - questions that the Supreme Court has studiously avoided for more than a century: what, exactly, is the purpose of punitive damages, and how is it constitutional to impose them as a form of punishment in a judicial proceeding without affording the defendant the protection of the Constitution's criminal procedural safeguards?

The Article argues that punitive damages are properly conceived of a form of punishment for private wrongs: judicially sanctioned private revenge. As such, the Article explains, it makes both theoretical and doctrinal sense to impose them without affording the defendant criminal procedural protections, which are necessitated only for the punishment of public wrongs on behalf of society. When, however, courts employ punitive damages as a form of punishment for public wrongs, they become a substitute for the criminal law and thus make an intolerable end run around the Bill of Rights. For that reason, Williams was ultimately correct that punitive damages must be limited to punishment for the harm done to the individual plaintiff, not the harm done to the general public.

The Article concludes by considering the future of punitive damages in light of the Williams decision. It concludes that, contrary to the emerging conventional wisdom, Williams does not stand in the way of the imposition of substantial extra-compensatory damages of the type favored by law and economics scholars as a means of forcing the defendant to internalize the costs of its behavior in order to achieve optimal deterrence. It is the fact that punitive damages punish, and that they do so in order to vindicate the interests of the state, that precludes their use to address third-party harms. Once the element of punishment is eliminated from the remedy, the constitutional infirmity at issue in Williams is ameliorated.

Sat
5
Jul
1:09 am

Alan Calnan (Southwestern Law School) has posted Duty and Integrity in Tort Law on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

The tort concept of duty lacks integrity in virtually every popular sense of that term. It is at once incomplete, unharmonious and unbeholden to any ethical principle or moral standard. Although these problems are interrelated, each corrupts tort jurisprudence in its own unique way.

The incompleteness problem is particularly acute in theories of intentional tort and strict liability, where it is either selectively invoked or completely ignored. While duty holds a more prominent place in negligence, it has been fragmented into myriad specialized obligations which remain mostly in disarray.

Such disunity, in turn, has fostered an even greater problem of disharmony, Tort scholars disagree about what duty is and what it is supposed to do. At one extreme, deontologists see duty as a strict moral obligation that judges must adopt and implement in accordance with natural law. At the other extreme, realists view duty merely as a terminological faýade for a judge’s unfettered policy decision that liability should or should not exist. Between these opposed camps lie the pragmatists, who conceive of duties as useful guiding principles, but readily recognize a judge’s authority to create new rules whenever social circumstances so require.

Beneath even this collective dissonance lurks the third integrity issue: the moral problem of principle. Besides the deontological view, which grounds duty in exceedingly strong moral principles, each of the remaining camps fail to give principle its due. Because the realists and pragmatists refuse to commit to any specific set of principles - most especially, liberal-moral principles rooted in American history, law, culture and values - their approaches necessarily lack a unifying standard, and so seem doomed to unpredictability, inconsistency and incoherence.

These problems, however, are not intractable. In fact, significant guidance can be found in the work of Ronald Dworkin, whose theory of "law as integrity" provides a methodology for judicial lawmaking and interpretation. Under this theory, judges deciding hard cases must seek to promote liberal values of equality, liberty and due process by interpreting the law in a way that not only squares with past precedent, but also reconciles and strengthens the law’s core principles and integrates them into a larger, cohesive framework.

Because tort law is largely judge-made, and the "law" part of torts consists primarily of its scheme of duties, Dworkin’s approach seems naturally fitted to the law’s current duty conundrum. Still, that fit may not be perfect. While Dworkin views history as mostly irrelevant to modern legal interpretation, the history of tort law may well tell us something quite profound about the law’s core principles, their connection to the law’s present value system and their role in shaping that system’s cultural identity.

For these reasons, I shall offer a modified Dworkinian theory of tort duty that not only fits and justifies the law’s present values, doctrines and structures, but also respects and promotes its historical tradition. Part I begins by briefly examining the role of duty in a liberal state. It then explores common law duties in particular, revealing their developmental patterns and exposing their integrity problems. Part II reviews Dworkin’s approach to these problems, explaining his theory of "law as integrity" and highlighting some of the problems in his approach. In Part III, the focus shifts to the concept of duty in tort law. After tracing the historical development of duty in torts, it examines the duty concepts in tort’s three modern theories of liability. It finds great integrity in intentional torts, a lost integrity in strict liability and the promise of integrity in negligence.

The remainder of the article seeks to fulfill this promise. In Part IV, I examine the history or vertical integrity of negligence’s duty concept, exposing several flaws in the modern view. Then, picking up on Dworkin’s approach, I explore the horizontal integrity of this concept, identifying in Part V duty’s substantive bases and conceptual limits, proposing in Part VI a structured, interpretive analysis, and illustrating in Part VII the application of that analysis in a difficult duty case. Part VIII culminates the discussion by offering a general methodology for handling all negligence duty issues. To put this new metatheory in perspective, the Conclusion highlights its significant features and addresses some of its likely criticisms.

Sat
5
Jul
1:09 am

Alan Calnan (Southwestern Law School) has posted Duty and Integrity in Tort Law on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

The tort concept of duty lacks integrity in virtually every popular sense of that term. It is at once incomplete, unharmonious and unbeholden to any ethical principle or moral standard. Although these problems are interrelated, each corrupts tort jurisprudence in its own unique way.

The incompleteness problem is particularly acute in theories of intentional tort and strict liability, where it is either selectively invoked or completely ignored. While duty holds a more prominent place in negligence, it has been fragmented into myriad specialized obligations which remain mostly in disarray.

Such disunity, in turn, has fostered an even greater problem of disharmony, Tort scholars disagree about what duty is and what it is supposed to do. At one extreme, deontologists see duty as a strict moral obligation that judges must adopt and implement in accordance with natural law. At the other extreme, realists view duty merely as a terminological faýade for a judge’s unfettered policy decision that liability should or should not exist. Between these opposed camps lie the pragmatists, who conceive of duties as useful guiding principles, but readily recognize a judge’s authority to create new rules whenever social circumstances so require.

Beneath even this collective dissonance lurks the third integrity issue: the moral problem of principle. Besides the deontological view, which grounds duty in exceedingly strong moral principles, each of the remaining camps fail to give principle its due. Because the realists and pragmatists refuse to commit to any specific set of principles - most especially, liberal-moral principles rooted in American history, law, culture and values - their approaches necessarily lack a unifying standard, and so seem doomed to unpredictability, inconsistency and incoherence.

These problems, however, are not intractable. In fact, significant guidance can be found in the work of Ronald Dworkin, whose theory of "law as integrity" provides a methodology for judicial lawmaking and interpretation. Under this theory, judges deciding hard cases must seek to promote liberal values of equality, liberty and due process by interpreting the law in a way that not only squares with past precedent, but also reconciles and strengthens the law’s core principles and integrates them into a larger, cohesive framework.

Because tort law is largely judge-made, and the "law" part of torts consists primarily of its scheme of duties, Dworkin’s approach seems naturally fitted to the law’s current duty conundrum. Still, that fit may not be perfect. While Dworkin views history as mostly irrelevant to modern legal interpretation, the history of tort law may well tell us something quite profound about the law’s core principles, their connection to the law’s present value system and their role in shaping that system’s cultural identity.

For these reasons, I shall offer a modified Dworkinian theory of tort duty that not only fits and justifies the law’s present values, doctrines and structures, but also respects and promotes its historical tradition. Part I begins by briefly examining the role of duty in a liberal state. It then explores common law duties in particular, revealing their developmental patterns and exposing their integrity problems. Part II reviews Dworkin’s approach to these problems, explaining his theory of "law as integrity" and highlighting some of the problems in his approach. In Part III, the focus shifts to the concept of duty in tort law. After tracing the historical development of duty in torts, it examines the duty concepts in tort’s three modern theories of liability. It finds great integrity in intentional torts, a lost integrity in strict liability and the promise of integrity in negligence.

The remainder of the article seeks to fulfill this promise. In Part IV, I examine the history or vertical integrity of negligence’s duty concept, exposing several flaws in the modern view. Then, picking up on Dworkin’s approach, I explore the horizontal integrity of this concept, identifying in Part V duty’s substantive bases and conceptual limits, proposing in Part VI a structured, interpretive analysis, and illustrating in Part VII the application of that analysis in a difficult duty case. Part VIII culminates the discussion by offering a general methodology for handling all negligence duty issues. To put this new metatheory in perspective, the Conclusion highlights its significant features and addresses some of its likely criticisms.

Larry Alexander and Saikrishna Prakash (University of San Diego School of Law and University of San Diego School of Law) have posted Tempest in an Empty Teapot: Why the Constitution Does Not Regulate Gerrymandering (William & Mary Law Review, Forthcoming) on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

Judges and scholars are convinced that the Constitution forbids gerrymandering that goes "too far" - legislative redistrictings that are too partisan, too focused on race, etc. Gerrymanders are said to be unconstitutional for many reasons - they dilute votes, they are anti-democratic, and they generate uncompetitive elections won by extremist candidates. Judges and scholars cite numerous clauses that gerrymanders supposedly violate - the Equal Protection Clause, the Guarantee Clause, and even the First Amendment. We dissent from this orthodoxy. Most of these claims rest on the notion that the Constitution establishes certain ideals about representation in legislatures and about the outcome and conduct of elections. Yet the Constitution nowhere provides that a party’s strength in the legislature should roughly mirror its strength in the populace, as the partisan gerrymandering cases suppose. Nor does the Constitution favor competition in legislative races, thereby forcing legislators to draw districting lines that maximize the number of competitive elections. In maintaining that the Constitution establishes districting and election ideals, the critics of gerrymandering have supposed that the Constitution incorporates their preferences about what is fair and just with respect to electoral outcomes. But as we show, there are innumerable reasonable preferences about the composition of districts and legislatures, not all of which can be satisfied simultaneously. More importantly, there is no reason to think that the Constitution enshrines any of these preferences about districting and election outcomes, let alone the critics’ particular preferences. We believe that the critics of gerrymandering have made the mistake of imagining that the Constitution incorporates their particular preferences. That is to say, they have sought a constitutional resolution to an ordinary political issue. Unfortunately, the search is futile, for the Constitution does not address the ills, real or imagined, associated with drawing district lines. The Constitution no more regulates gerrymandering than it regulates pork barrel spending or the many advantages of incumbency.

Highly recommended.

Larry Alexander and Saikrishna Prakash (University of San Diego School of Law and University of San Diego School of Law) have posted Tempest in an Empty Teapot: Why the Constitution Does Not Regulate Gerrymandering (William & Mary Law Review, Forthcoming) on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

Judges and scholars are convinced that the Constitution forbids gerrymandering that goes "too far" - legislative redistrictings that are too partisan, too focused on race, etc. Gerrymanders are said to be unconstitutional for many reasons - they dilute votes, they are anti-democratic, and they generate uncompetitive elections won by extremist candidates. Judges and scholars cite numerous clauses that gerrymanders supposedly violate - the Equal Protection Clause, the Guarantee Clause, and even the First Amendment. We dissent from this orthodoxy. Most of these claims rest on the notion that the Constitution establishes certain ideals about representation in legislatures and about the outcome and conduct of elections. Yet the Constitution nowhere provides that a party’s strength in the legislature should roughly mirror its strength in the populace, as the partisan gerrymandering cases suppose. Nor does the Constitution favor competition in legislative races, thereby forcing legislators to draw districting lines that maximize the number of competitive elections. In maintaining that the Constitution establishes districting and election ideals, the critics of gerrymandering have supposed that the Constitution incorporates their preferences about what is fair and just with respect to electoral outcomes. But as we show, there are innumerable reasonable preferences about the composition of districts and legislatures, not all of which can be satisfied simultaneously. More importantly, there is no reason to think that the Constitution enshrines any of these preferences about districting and election outcomes, let alone the critics’ particular preferences. We believe that the critics of gerrymandering have made the mistake of imagining that the Constitution incorporates their particular preferences. That is to say, they have sought a constitutional resolution to an ordinary political issue. Unfortunately, the search is futile, for the Constitution does not address the ills, real or imagined, associated with drawing district lines. The Constitution no more regulates gerrymandering than it regulates pork barrel spending or the many advantages of incumbency.

Highly recommended.